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This paper establishes ﬁrst an identiﬁcation of stationary equilibria of an inﬁnite-
horizon economy and equilibria of a naturally related ﬁnite economy. Then it shows
how to obtain new properties of each of the frameworks by means of importing
known properties of the other framework. More speciﬁcally, the connection is es-
tablished, ﬁrstly, between cycles of an overlapping generations economy and the
equilibria of a ﬁnite economy with a cyclical structure. Such connection is then
shown to hold also when extrinsic uncertainty is introduced in the models.
In order to obtain the adequate counterpart of the connection once the extrinsic
uncertainty is introduced, we are lead to consider in the overlapping generations
framework sunspot equilibria of a broad class, called here sunspot cycles. Their
status with respect to the well-known k-SSE (stationary sunspot equilibria driven
by a Markov chain ﬂuctuating between k states) is quite subtle: it turns out to
be the case that usual k-SSE are particularly simple instances of sunspot cycles of
period 1, while it is also true that a sunspot cycle of the kind and any period is
a k-SSE as well, but with a high number of states and strong symmetries in the
matrix of probabilities of transition between them (including zero entries). The
interest on these sunspot cycles comes from their ability to simplify considerably
the beliefs on which the agents have to coordinate for one of these equilibria to be
realized, while still being able to deliver dynamics which are complex enough to
have a positive import. Thus, it is shown that this class of simple sunspot cycles
of the overlapping generations economies, and the equilibria of the ﬁnite cyclical
economies with asymmetric information on an extrinsic uncertainty, can actually
be identiﬁed.
Finally, the previous connections between the equilibria of the two frameworks,
with and without sunspots, are used to show that: a) overlapping generations
economies allowing for heterogeneity across generations typically ﬂuctuate aperi-
odically for arbitrarily long periods of time, while nevertheless being able to exhibit
an approximate cyclical behavior during those periods (this result may account, in
a stylized way, for the typical irregular recurrence of the actual business cycles);
and b) the presence of asymmetric information on an extrinsic uncertainty may
induce continua of equilibria in ﬁnite economies.
21. Introduction
Consider the simplest overlapping generations economy. Take two consecutive
agents out of the never-ending chain of generations and, say, close a loop with
them. The resulting economy is an Edgeworth box where each agent faces his
mirror image. Any equilibrium in this Edgeworth box corresponds to a cycle of
period 2 of the original overlapping generations economy and conversely, including
the steady state as a ”degenerate” cycle of period 2 (see the Figure 1 and Balasko
and Ghiglino (1995)).
ﬁgure 1
This is the simplest example of the connections existing between stationary equi-
libria in a dynamic set-up and the equilibria of a symmetric static framework. Nev-
ertheless, the previous thought experiment can actually be redone taking out any
number n of consecutive generations and, again, closing a loop with them. The
resulting ﬁnite economy has now a very peculiar cyclical structure, which makes
of any of its equilibria a cycle of a period (divisor of) n (see Tuinstra and Wedde-
pohl (1997) for a ﬁrst approach to this idea, although not identical to the approach
presented here).
The problem of clarifying the links between dynamic and static economies shar-
ing some type of symmetry and between their equilibria underlies in previous at-
tempts to establish a connection between sunspot equilibria of overlapping gen-
erations economies and correlated equilibria of strategic market games (see, for
instance, Maskin and Tirole (1987), Forg` es and Peck (1995), D´ avila (1999)). Actu-
ally, the link conjectured by Maskin and Tirole (1987) between, on the one hand,
the correlated equilibria of their 2-agents, 2-commodities exchange economy with
asymmetric information on an extrinsic uncertainty and, on the other hand, the
sunspot equilibria of an overlapping generations economy constructed after that
ﬁnite economy, hints at a sort of extension to a framework with (extrinsic) un-
certainty of the connection mentioned above between the cycles of the dynamic
economy and the equilibria of the static one.
In eﬀect, taking two consecutive agents out of the chain of overlapping gen-
erations and closing a loop with them makes of the publicly observed sunspot a
distinct privately observed signal for each of the two agents1. Thus the possibility
of a correlated equilibrium in which each agent uses his privately observed signal
as randomizing device appears. Indeed, when considered in the Edgeworth box
constructed with the two consecutive agents taken out of the chain, the sunspot
equilibria of the original overlapping generations economy which ﬂuctuate randomly
between two states according to a Markov process become, quite naturally, corre-
lated equilibria of the market game underlying the 2 agents economy with asym-
metric information2 (see Figure 2).
1This is the eﬀect of collapsing the line of time in one instant as the loop is closed. Nevertheless,
the ”publicly observed” sunspot was already private information for each cohort of young agents
actually, since it is disclosed sequentially.
2As it will be shown below (see Example 1 in section 4.1), the corners of the of the smaller
box within the Edgeworth box in Figure 2 constitute the support of a sunspot equilibrium of the
overlapping generations economy with consumer 1 as representative agent. They constitute as
3ﬁgure 2
These sunspot equilibria are similar to cycles of period 2, but for the fact that the
ﬂuctuations between the two states are random instead of deterministic. Indeed, the
cycles of period 2 can be considered as extreme (or degenerate) cases of stochastic
equilibria3 in which the probability of changing the state is actually 1 always.
Nevertheless, as it will be argued below (see Example 2 in section 4.2), such sunspot
equilibria may not be the most natural extension of cycles to a framework with
extrinsic uncertainty. At any rate, they are deﬁnitely not the right extension if we
want it to hold in general (see D´ avila (1999)). Rather, the correct counterpart are
the equilibria of a more general and, at the same time, somewhat special class that I
shall call sunspot cycles (their seemingly contradictory character as simultaneously
more general and particular than the usual sunspot equilibria is only apparent, since
each statement correspond to diﬀerent viewpoints; see the remarks in section 4.2 for
clearer insights on this). Intuitively, these sunspot cycles consist of superimposing a
sunspot signal to a cycle, instead of looking at the cycle as the sunspot signal itself.
In such sunspot cycles, the periodicity of the underlying cycle and the number of
values among which the sunspot ﬂuctuates become thus completely unrelated.
Although the kind of sunspot cycles retained to establish the connection are, at
any rate, usual k-SSE (sunspot equilibria driven by a Markov chain, see Azariadis
and Guesnerie (1986), for instance), but with a very speciﬁc Markov process (with a
matrix of probabilities of transitions full of symmetries and zero entries), they may
deserve nevertheless some attention for their ability to deliver reasonably complex
ﬂuctuations, while keeping the sunspot process on which the agents are supposed
to coordinate spontaneously much simpler than what an unstructured k-SSE would
require. This may enhance the the likelihood of a positive import of the sunspot
equilibrium concept as a rationale for the business cycle.
The ultimate goal of this investigation is to use the connections established as
”bridges” joining the two frameworks and allowing to derive properties in each of
them by means of ”importing” known properties of the other. Some examples of this
use are provided below. They essentially establish that: a) once the representative
hypothesis is dropped, we should not expect to observe any pure cycle, although
the equilibrium allocation can robustly exhibit irregular but recurrent ﬂuctuations
”looking like cycles”; and b) the use of private, irrelevant information by the agents
of a ﬁnite economy may make it have continua of equilibria, worsening thus quite
seriously the problem of spontaneous coordination on an equilibrium.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the two
economies. In section 3, I present a straightforward connection between the cycles
of the overlapping generations economy and the equilibria of its associated cyclical
economies4. This is mainly done for the sake of completeness. Although strictly
speaking section 3 is, so to speak, a special case of section 4, keeping the uncertainty
well the allocation of resources of a correlated equilibrium of the economy formed by consumer 1
and his mirror image, consumer 2 (see the Example 2 in section 4.2).
3This is not completely unrelated (or rather not unrelated at all) to the fact that they lay at
the ”extremes” of the 8-shaped ﬁgure containing the sunspot equilibria in Figure 2.
4Such a connection had been noticed for cycles of period 2 by Balasko and Ghiglino (1995), and
then it was extended, in a diﬀerent way than the one presented here, by Tuinstra and Weddepohl
(1997) to cycles of any period.
4out of the stage for a while eases the exposition a lot. Section 4 extends the
connection between the equilibria of these economies to the case where there is
(extrinsic) uncertainty too. Finally, section 5 shows how the connection can be
used to obtain properties in these two frameworks.
2. A simple overlapping generations economy
and its associated cyclical economies
Consider the simplest overlapping generations economy, i.e. an economy con-
sisting of a never-ending sequence of generations dated by t 2 Z. All the members
of a typical generation born at date t are identical to a representative agent who
lives for two periods, is endowed with positive quantities5 et
t and et
t+1 of the single
commodity of the economy at dates t and t + 1, and has preferences over the con-
sumption of this commodity along his lifetime which are represented by a utility
function ut depending on consumption when young ct
t and consumption when old
ct
t+1, which is standard in the sense that it is continuous on R2
+, twice continuously
diﬀerentiable on R2
++, strictly monotone6, strictly quasi-concave7 and well-behaved
at the boundary8. Actually, throughout almost all the paper (except in section 5),
all the generations are going to be identical, in such a way that (et
t;et
t+1) and ut
are all equal to a common endowments point e = (e1;e2) and utility function u.
This assumption is unimportant: the propositions in sections 3 and 4 hold for het-
erogeneous agents as well, while dropping their names by now helps in making the
exposition lighter. Thus the entire overlapping generations economy is completely
characterized by (u;e).
Now, to any given overlapping generations economy (u;e) and positive integer
n, associate an economy with n commodities and n consumers deﬁned as follows:











e1 if h = i
e2 if h = i + 1
0 otherwise
(1)
where i = 1;:::;n, and with the understanding from now on that i + 1 stands for
1 when i = n, in such a way that the utility function and endowments of the n-th
consumer are u(cn
n;cn
1) and (e2;0;:::;0;e1). This economy is a sort of closed loop
of n consecutive agents of the overlapping generations economy (u;e). Let us refer
to it as the n-cyclical economy (u;e;n) associated to the overlapping generations
(u;e).
5More precisely, non-negative but not simultaneously equal to zero. In what follows, subscripts
refer to dated commodities, superscripts to generations.
6In the sense that Du(c1;c2) is always in the strictly positive orthant.
7In the sense that D2u(c1;c2) is always negative deﬁnite in the subspace orthogonal to Du(c1;c2).
8In the sense that either there is no intersection between the axes and the indiﬀerence curves
or any such intersection is tangent.
9Again, superscripts refer to consumers, subscripts to commodities.
53. The connection under certainty
3.1 The overlapping generations economy under certainty.











t+1  e2)  0:
(2)
Under the assumptions made on u and e, the unique solution of this problem is
completely characterized by the corresponding ﬁrst order conditions.
An equilibrium of the overlapping generations economy (u;e) consists of an al-
location of resources f(ct
t;ct
t+1)gt2Z and prices fptgt2Z such that
(1) for all t 2 Z, (ct
t;ct
t+1) is the solution to (2), and
(2) the allocation of resources is feasible.
The next proposition gives a complete characterization of the equilibrium allo-
cations of the overlapping generations economy (u;e).
Proposition 1.
(1) If the allocation of resources f(ct
t;ct
t+1)gt2Z and prices fptgt2Z constitute





t  e1) + D2u(ct
t;ct
t+1)(ct
t+1  e2) = 0: (3)
(2) If the allocation of resources f(ct
t;ct





t+1 = e1 + e2; (4)





t+1)gt2Z and fptgt2Z is an equilibrium of the overlapping genera-
tions economy (u;e), then for every t 2 Z, (ct
t;ct
t+1) is a solution to (2) i.e.
there exists a positive multiplier t such that
D1u(ct
t;ct
t+1)  tpt = 0
D2u(ct
t;ct
t+1)  tpt+1 = 0
pt(ct
t  e1) + pt+1(ct
t+1  e2) = 0:
(5)
Multiplying the ﬁrst equation by (ct
t  e1), the second by (ct
t+1  e2) and
adding them up taking into account the budget constraint in the third
equation, the condition (3) follows.
(2) In order to produce prices fptgt2Z supporting f(ct
t;ct
t+1)gt2Z as an equilib-
rium allocation, let p1 be any positive price and deﬁne10, for each t 2 Z,
10Notice that, since Du(c) 2 R2
++ guarantees that the terms of f(ct
t;ct
t+1)gt2Z are all located
either strictly northwest or strictly southeast of e (if not all equal to e), the feasibility condition
implies that if c1
1  e1 < 0 (> 0), then ct
t  e1 < 0 (> 0), i.e. ct1
t  e2 > 0 (< 0), for all t 2 Z
and thus pt and t are always positive. If the allocation of resources is the autarky, then the ﬁrst
order conditions will be satisﬁed by any positive price p1, with pt = (D2u(e)=D1u(e))t1p1 and




















Then, for all t 2 Z, the allocation of resources is feasible by assumption





























secondly, the partial derivative of the lagrangian with respect to ct
t+1 is zero
because of the very deﬁnition of t; and, ﬁnally, the partial derivative with
respect to ct
t is also zero since
D1u(ct
t;ct

































by mere substitutions, recalling (4) and (3).

Some equilibria of the overlapping generations economy (u;e) among the un-
countably many of them that typically exist, exhibit a regularity which lessens the
heroic character of the assumption of a spontaneous coordination of every agent of
the economy on one of them.11 Speciﬁcally, a cycle of period n of the overlapping
generations economy (u;e) is an equilibrium which treats equally any two genera-
tions n periods apart from each other. Notice that this condition deﬁnes a cycle of
period n in a quite broad sense, since it allows to see any such cycle as a cycle of
any other period n0 multiple of n. In particular, it allows for a steady state (i.e.
an equilibrium which treats equally all the generations) to be considered a cycle of
any period. Thus f(ct
t;ct









for any t and t0 such that t0 = t + rn for some integer r 2 Z.
(Notice that the previous deﬁnition of cycles does not take into account the
equilibrium prices. As a consequence, it encompasses as a cycle of any period the
11Although there may still be countably many of such recurrent equilibria: recall Grandmont’s
result (Grandmont(1985)) establishing that, should there be a cycle of period 3, then the economy
would have cycles of any period.
7autarky allocation f(e1;e2)gt2Z too, which would not qualify typically as a cycle
if the same kind of regularity was required for prices. In eﬀect, for any cycle of
period n distinct from the autarky, any pt and pt0 do coincide whenever they are n













































































after rearranging the denominators, substituting ct
0
t0 to ct
t and noting that then
each fraction becomes 1 because of the feasibility of the allocation of resources. As







pt0, which cannot show any cyclical regularity unless
D2u(e)
D1u(e) = 1.)
Therefore a cycle of period n is completely characterized by at most n distinct










1  e1) + D2u(ci
1;ci
2)(ci





1 = e1 + e2 (14)
where, again, i + 1 stands for 1 if i = n.
3.2 The cyclical economy under certainty.











i+1  e2)  0
(15)
whose unique solution is again completely characterized by the ﬁrst order condi-
tions.










(1) for all i = 1;:::;n0, (ci
i;ci
i+1) is the solution to (15), and
(2) the allocation of resources is feasible.
12Strictly speaking, the problem should be posed in Rn0
+ instead of R2
+, but the cyclical struc-
ture of the economy makes this absolutely unnecessary. Recall also that, in what follows, i + 1
stands for 1 whenever i = n0.
8The equilibrium allocations of the cyclical economy (u;e;n0) are completely char-
acterized by the following proposition.
Proposition 2.













i  e1) + D2u(ci
i;ci
i+1)(ci
i+1  e2) = 0: (16)










i+1 = e1 + e2; (17)
for all i = 1;:::;n0, then it is an equilibrium allocation of the cyclical econ-
omy (u;e;n0).
Proof. It is identical to that of Proposition 1 characterizing the equilibrium alloca-
tions of the overlapping generations (u;e), substituting i to t wherever the latter
appears and modifying the range of the indices from t 2 Z to i = 1;:::;n0 accord-
ingly. 
3.3 The connection under certainty.
The next proposition establishes the connection between the cycles of the over-
lapping generations economy (u;e) and the equilibria of its cyclical economies
(u;e;n).
Proposition 3. Any cycle of period n of an overlapping generations economy (u;e)
can be translated into an equilibrium of any of its cyclical economies (u;e;n0) with
n0 multiple of n, and conversely
Proof. The statement above is a straightforward consequence of comparing the
equations characterizing the equilibrium allocations in each of the two frameworks,
which happen to be the same up to a change of notation.
In eﬀect, eliminating ci
2 in (13,14) and ci
i+1 in (16,17) and letting13 ci
1 = ci
i, the
two sets of equations turn out to be the same but for the number of equations: n
in (13) while n0 in (16). Since n0 is a multiple of n, a solution to (13) becomes a
solution to (16) by replication and, the other way round, a solution to (16) is at
least a solution to (13) for the case n = n0, while it may well be also a replication
of a solution to (13) for some n divisor of n0.14 
Proposition 3 applies obviously to any steady state also, considered as a degen-
erate cycle of period 1.
13Two minor points about notation are in order here. Firstly, it would have been preferable
to use diﬀerent letters to denote consumption in each of the economies, should we have wanted to
avoid now the somewhat confusing condition cn
1 = cn
n which appears when i = n. Such a condition
does not refer by any means to a constraint on the consumption bundle of the n-th consumer of
the cyclical economy, but to the identiﬁcation of his consumption of commodity n (the right-hand
side) to the n-th consumption when young in the cycle of the overlapping generations economy
(the left-hand side). A more rigorous notation has been discarded for the sake of the readability
of the paper. Secondly, another source of confusion may originate in the fact that the left-hand
side index i runs from 1 through n, while the right-hand side index i runs from 1 through n0,
multiple of n. Whenever n < n0 it goes without saying that, for any right-hand side i exceeding
n, ci
i is to be identiﬁed to ci mod n
1 .
14If it is invariant to the n-th power of the n0  n0 matrix  whose typical entry ij equals 1
whenever j = i + 1 (recall that n0 + 1 stands for 1) and is 0 otherwise.
9Corollary 1. If (¯ c1;¯ c2) is a steady state of the overlapping generations economy
(u;e), then any n-replica of it f(¯ c1;¯ c2);:::;(¯ c1;¯ c2)g constitutes an equilibrium al-
location of the cyclical economy (u;e;n) and conversely, any symmetric equilibrium
of (u;e;n) is an n-replica of a steady state of (u;e).
The next corollary follows also straightforwardly from a mere re-labeling of any
equilibrium allocation of a cyclical economy.
Corollary 2. Any cyclical permutation15 of an equilibrium allocation of a cyclical
economy (u;e;n) is still an equilibrium allocation of this economy.
4. The connection under uncertainty
4.1 The overlapping generations with sunspots.
Assume now that in the overlapping generations economy (u;e) there is a sunspot
signal16 t which is publicly observed at every period17 and takes one of k > 1
values at random18. Before getting into further details, the fact that the extrinsic
uncertainty represented by this sunspot signal may end up having an inﬂuence on
the outcome of the economy can be given the following rationale.
The agent born at t cares, in order to make his decision, about prices at t and
t + 1. In the presence of the (extrinsic) uncertainty introduced by the sunspot
signal, he cannot exclude a priori a possible dependence of the prices on the values
taken by the sunspot and therefore he is uncertain about the price he may face at
t+1 (at date t the price is observed as well as the sunspot). Thus, the agent t has to
choose at t his current consumption and a plan of consumption at t+1 contingent
to the price actually realized at t + 1, bearing in mind some expectations about
that price. These expectations may take, for instance, the form of a dependence
of the price at t + 1 on the value of the sunspot at that date. Thus the agent
t will rather use, in the making of his decision, the information conveyed by the
value of the sunspot at t about the probability distribution of the sunspot at t+1,
i.e. about the probability distribution which applies to the prices at t + 1 as well
actually, according to his beliefs. The consumption choice at t will thus show a
dependence on the sunspot observed at t, and it will moreover determine the price
15That is to say, the permutation of the indices of the allocation and prices by any power of .
16A signal with no inﬂuence on the fundamentals of the economy, i.e. a signal representing
states of the world with respect to which the fundamentals (preferences, endowments, technology
also if there were production) remain unchanged. It was ﬁrst noticed in Shell (1977) that such
signals could nevertheless have an inﬂuence on the outcome of the economy, leading to a so-
called sunspot equilibrium. Later on Cass and Shell (1983) provided a characterization of the
circumstances in which no sunspot equilibrium can exist (in few words, the Arrow-Debreu world),
which amounts to a characterization by negation of the set-ups where they are likely to emerge.
See Chiappori and Guesnerie (1991) and Guesnerie and Woodford (1996) for surveys on the
subsequent literature that followed.
17Notice that, because of the demographic structure of the model, the signal publicly observed
at each date, is actually private information of the generation currently making its consumption
choices.
18As a matter of fact, if we let k = 1 in what follows in such a way that the stochastic process
driving t is a trivial one giving to the signal the same constant value at every period with
probability 1, then all the claims and proofs still go through. Thus the results shown in section
3 for the case under certainty are a particular case of those proved in this section. They have
nevertheless been presented separately in order to ease the exposition.
10at t, resulting so in a dependence of the price at t on the current sunspot too. If
this dependence ends up being the dependence believed to hold between the price
t + 1 and the sunspot at t + 1, then such beliefs turn out to be self-fulﬁlling19.
In eﬀect, consider the problem of a member of a generation t of the overlapping
generations economy (u;e) with a sunspot signal ftgt2Z. What he knows about
the prevailing state of the world s = (:::;t1;t;t+1;:::), from the continuum
S = f1;:::;kgZ of possible states, is at most the history of sunspot values up to t,
st = (:::;t1;t), as well as the price20 ptst for consumption ct
tst at t, and expects
a price pt+1s0
t+1 for consumption ct
t+1s0
t+1 at t + 1 if s0
t+1 happens (where s0
t+1 is
necessarily such that21 s0
t = st) with probability P(s0
t+1js0
t = st). Then the member































The unique solution to this problem is completely characterized by its ﬁrst order
conditions.
An equilibrium of the overlapping generations economy (u;e) with a sunspot sig-














t=st) is the solution to (18),
and
(2) the allocation of resources is feasible.
The following proposition provides a complete characterization of the equilibrium
allocations of the overlapping generations economy (u;e) with a sunspot signal
ftgt2Z.
Proposition 4.








constitute an equilibrium of the overlapping generations economy (u;e) with

























19More exactly, the expectations held after such beliefs turn out to be rational expectations
actually.
20In what follows superscripts refer again to generations, while subscripts to dated, sunspot
history-contingent commodities. The sequential unfolding of the allocation of resources of an over-
lapping generations economy prevents any generation to make consumption decisions contingent
to information which will be disclosed after the consumption takes place. This is a distinctive
feature of an overlapping generations economy under uncertainty which does not appear in a one-
shot economy (like, for instance, an Arrow-Debreu economy) where consumption takes place after
every uncertainty, if any, is resolved, even if the decisions may be made ex ante contingent to the
realization of any uncertainty.
21Here s0
t denotes the truncation of the history s0
t+1 up to t.












tst = e1 + e2 (20)
for all s 2 S and all t 2 Z, then it is an equilibrium allocation of the









and prices fptstgt2Z;s2S constitute an






is the solution to (18), i.e. there exist positive multipliers t
s0
t+1 for all s0
t+1
such that s0






























tst  e1) + pt+1s0
t+1(ct
t+1s0




Multiplying the ﬁrst equation by (ct
tst  e1), each of the equations in the
second line by the corresponding (ct
t+1s0
t+1 e2) and adding all them up tak-
ing into account the budget constraints in the third line, then the condition
(19) follows.








an equilibrium allocation, let p1s1, for every22 s 2 S, be any positive price



















and for all s0 2 S such that s0

















Then, for all t 2 Z and all s 2 S, the feasibility constraint is satisﬁed by
assumption and the ﬁrst order conditions (21) are satisﬁed too: ﬁrstly, the
budget constraints are satisﬁed since, for all s0





































22Actually, just one p1s1 needs to be ﬁxed arbitrarily, all the other prices at date 1 and at
every state of the world s being then determined by the normalization (22).
12where the second equality results from the normalization (22) adopted; sec-
ondly, the partial derivatives of the lagrangian with respect to ct
t+1s0
t+1 are
satisﬁed by the very deﬁnition of the multipliers t
s0
t+1, and ﬁnally, the par-
tial derivative with respect to ct
tst is again satisﬁed by mere substitutions,
recalling (20) and (19).

Any equilibrium of the overlapping generations economy (u;e) with a sunspot
signal ftgt2Z whose allocation of resources does actually depend (in a non trivial
way) on the state s realized is known as a sunspot equilibrium.
Notice that the allocation of an equilibrium of the overlapping generations econ-
omy (u;e) with a sunspot signal ftgt2Z must specify in general not only how the
resources are allocated at every date t 2 Z (as in the case with certainty) but for
every possible state s 2 S also. An equilibrium allocation must thus specify for
every generation t what its typical member will receive for any possible history23
st in which he may be born and any continuation t+1 of it in t + 1. Nonetheless,
such an allocation may exhibit some regularities, as in the case without uncertainty,
which make it simpler and, hence, likelier to emerge from spontaneous coordination
of the agents. Notice, however, that the regularities may arise now not only with
respect to the dates t 2 Z, as in the cycles, but with respect to the histories st as
well.
Concerning the regularities with respect to t, let us call a sunspot cycle of period
n (and of order k, following the literature on k-SSE, for the number of values taken
by the sunspot) any equilibrium whose allocation treats equally any two generations














for every t;t0 2 Z such that t0 = t + rn for some r 2 Z, and every s; ˜ s 2 S
such that st = ˜ st0. Thus the equilibrium allocation of a sunspot cycle of pe-






























1s2 = e1 + e2: (28)
The simplest of such equilibria are obviously those for which n = 1.
23Notice that there are uncountably many possible histories (:::;t1;t) 2 f1;:::;kgN
24Here s1
2 stands for the one-step forward shift of the history s2 = (:::;s23;s22;s21), i.e. the
history (:::;s24;s23;s22). With this notation the usual condition s0
t+1js0




1 = st. The ﬁrst one seems to be eloquent enough, while being less cumbersome, to
justify this minor redundancy in notation.
13As for regularities with respect to sunspot histories, an equilibrium may be such
that, for instance, it allocates the resources in the same way at any two histories
up to any given date t 2 Z which coincide in the m last periods besides the current












for all t 2 Z and any s; ˜ s 2 S such that ti = ˜ ti, for all i = 0;:::;m. The
simplest of such equilibria are clearly those with m = 0, in which case, for any
s; ˜ s 2 S and t 2 Z such that t = ˜ t, it holds ct
tst = ct
t˜ st. For such equilibria, the
feasibility condition implies necessarily ct
t+1st+1 = ct
t+1˜ st+1 as well, for any s; ˜ s 2 S
and t 2 Z such that t+1 = ˜ t+1. Therefore, these are allocations in which the
consumption decisions depend on the current sunspot only and, hence, the history
st of sunspot values up to t can be identiﬁed to the current sunspot value t. Thus
the conditions characterizing an equilibrium with this sort of regularity with respect





















t+1t+1 = e1 + e2 (31)
for all t 2 Z and all t+1 = 1;:::;k, where m
tt+1
st1 in (30) stands for P(s0
t+1js0
t =
st), i.e. the probability of transition from t to each t+1 given the history st1 up
to t  1.25
Considering the two types of regularity together, the simplest sunspot cycle of
period n and order k of the overlapping generations economy (u;e) with a general
sunspot signal ftgt2Z that can be thought of, is an equilibrium which, besides
treating equally any two generations n periods apart from each other, allocates












whenever t0 = t + rn for some r 2 Z. Thus, a sunspot cycle of period n and
order k, dependent on the current sunspot only, is completely characterized by

























25Notice that, as long as k  3, the continuum of possible histories up to t1 is not a problem
for this dependence of the probabilities of transition on st1 because of the positive number of
degrees of freedom for determining such probabilities. On the contrary, if k = 2, the condition
(30) and Σm = 1 determine unambiguously each row of the matrix of probabilities of transition
and, hence, any such equilibrium has to be necessarily markovian.




12 = e1 + e2; (34)
where, as usual, i + 1 stands for 1 when i = n.
Yet, a particularly interesting class of equilibria is that of those equilibria for
which the process followed by the sunspot signal is especially simple, i.e. such that
the probabilities of transition m12
s do not depend on the entire history of t,
but only on that of the most recent periods up to a ﬁnite number of them, maybe
none, in which case the sunspot signal (and, we will say, the sunspot cycle too) is
markovian. Such equilibria are specially appealing because, unlike the equilibria
where m12
s depends on the entire history s, they do not require the agents to be
able to handle inﬁnite sets of information, but rather a ﬁnite number of past values
of t along with a matrix of probabilities of transition.
Thus, a markovian sunspot cycle of period n and order k, dependent on the
current sunspot only, is completely characterized by at most n distinct sunspot-


























12 = e1 + e2: (36)
Once arrived to this point, some remarks are in order26. Firstly, notice that the
role of steady state in the deterministic framework (a cycle of period 1, indeed), is
played now by the sunspot cycles of period 1. Secondly, notice too that a markovian
sunspot cycle of period 1 and order k, whose allocation of consumption to each agent
depends on the current sunspot only27, turns out to be a sunspot equilibrium of the
class k-SSE (for Stationary Sunspot Equilibrium of order k) studied in, for instance,
Azariadis and Guesnerie (1986), Guesnerie (1986), Chiappori and Guesnerie (1989),
Chiappori, Geoﬀard and Guesnerie (1992). As a matter of fact, the k-SSE are
the simplest sunspot equilibria that can be produced in an overlapping generations
economy (u;e). The Example 1 below shows how the characterization of equilibrium
allocations provided by Proposition 4 works for them.
Finally, notice that a markovian sunspot cycle dependent only on the current
sunspot, whose period is n and driven by a sunspot signal taking k values, ﬂuc-
tuates typically between kn states. For instance, in the Figure 3 the support of
a markovian sunspot cycle of period 2 and order 2 as well is depicted28. At such
an equilibrium, the partition at each date of the economy resources between the
26Besides those already made on the notion of cycle, which apply straightforwardly to that
of sunspot cycle, namely that any sunspot cycle of period n is also a sunspot cycle of any other
period n0 multiple of n.
27Note that there is no relation at all between the, so to speak, ”memory” of an equilibrium
allocation and the ”memory” of the sunspot process driving it.
28The gradients at the supporting points have to be such that the ﬁrst order conditions are
satisﬁed.
15contemporary young and old agents, ﬂuctuates between the four points on the di-
agonal, although alternating (deterministically) the inner and the outer points for
the (random) choice of the partition. Thus sunspot cycles are able to deliver con-
siderably ﬁner grids for ﬂuctuations than the k-SSE, for a sunspot signal of a given
cardinality k, i.e. assuming the same level of sophistication of the sunspot theory
held by the agents or, to put it in other words, for the same cost in terms of their
assumed ability to attain spontaneous coordination. Nonetheless, every markovian
sunspot cycle of this kind is actually a ”high” order k-SSE with a Markov matrix
with special symmetries . For instance, that of the sunspot cycle in Figure 3 may
be of the form 0
B
@
0 1  m12 m12 0
1  m12 0 0 m12
m21 0 0 1  m21





Example 1. A k-SSE of the overlapping generations economy (u;e) with a sunspot
signal driven by a k  k Markov matrix (mij) is an equilibrium whose allocation
of resources treats equally all the generations of the economy and the consump-
tion when young depends only on the current sunspot signal and not on its entire
history (the feasibility condition on the allocation of resources imposes then that
the consumption when old depends on the current sunspot only as well). Let ci
1
denote in this example29 the consumption when young at any t such that t = i,
and c
j
2 the consumption when old at any t such that t = j. Then the allocation
of resources of a k-SSE has to satisfy





















1 = e1 + e2 (39)
(the prices supporting such an allocation as an equilibrium are also time-independent
and contingent only on the current sunspot only because of the normalization (22)
used).
Notice that the left-hand side of equation (38) is a convex linear combination




with its corresponding excess demand. A quite natural interpretation of equation





j=1) to be the optimal current consumption and
contingent plan of future consumption of a generation observing the i-th value of the
sunspot, the orthogonality of the gradient with the corresponding excess demand
that characterizes the optimal choices in the case with certainty, has to be satisﬁed
in mean. As a consequence, not all the inner products in (38) can have the same
29Instead of c1i (resp. c2j), as we should write according to the previous notation.







2 ) which are separated
by the oﬀer curve. Assuming c1
1 < c2
1 <  < ck




2 <  < c1





2) for every i = 1;:::;k (see Figure 4).
Figure 4
Thus, in order to exhibit such a k-SSE we only need to be able to produce a box
with its top-left and bottom-right corners on the line going through the endowments
e with slope 1,30 and such that the top corners and bottom corners are separated
by the oﬀer curve. It may be clear now why the indeterminacy of the steady state
in the perfect foresight dynamics (i.e. that the slope of the oﬀer curve at the non
autarkic steady state is smaller than 1 in absolute value) is a suﬃcient condition
for the existence of sunspot equilibria of this class (a continuum of them indeed),
although it is by no means necessary. It is clearly nonetheless a necessary condition
to be possible to produce such sunspot equilibria arbitrarily close to the steady
state, i.e. local sunspot equilibria.31
4.2 The cyclical economy with private sunspots.
Consider now the cyclical economy (u;e;n). Assume that each consumer i ob-
serves privately a diﬀerent sunspot signal si which can take k values at random
each. Thus the state of the world is an extrinsic random variable s = (s1;:::;sn)
taking values in S = f1;:::;kg
n. Let s denote the probability of s being the
prevailing state and f(pis)n
i=1gs2S be the prices of each commodity i contingent to
the state of the world s. Actually, as it will be seen below, for any equilibrium
allocation the prices supporting it will be such that each pis depends only on si.
30This condition takes care of the feasibility of the allocation of resources.
31See Chiappori, Geoﬀard and Guesnerie (1992) for a characterization of the existence of
local k-SSE around the steady state of an abstract one-step forward looking dynamical system,
D´ avila (1997) for the existence of the same kind of local sunspot equilibria in similar systems
but with predetermined variables or memory, and Woodford (1984) for a result showing that the
indeterminacy of the steady state in the perfect foresight dynamics is a necessary and suﬃcient
condition for the existence of more general local sunspot equilibria. D´ avila, Gottardi and Kajii
(1999) provide an argument showing that, however, any economy with a determinate steady state
can be approximated arbitrarily closely by another economy with k-SSE in an arbitrarily small
neighborhood of its determinate steady state.





















i+1s0  e2) , 8s0js0
i = si
(40)
where, as usual, i+1 stands for 1 when i = n, and the denominator has been dropped
from the conditional probability for the sake of readability. An equilibrium of the






i=1 and prices f(pis)n
i=1gs2S such that
(1) for all i = 1;:::;n and all si = 1;:::;k, (ci
isi;(ci
i+1s0)s0js0
i=si) is the solution
to the problem (40) above, and
(2) the allocation of resources is feasible.
The next proposition gives a complete characterization of the equilibrium alloca-
tion of the cyclical economy (u;e;n) with asymmetric information on the extrinsic
uncertainty.
Proposition 5.





i=1 and the prices
f(pis)n
i=1gs2S constitute an equilibrium of the cyclical economy (u;e;n) with



























i+1si+1 = e1 + e2 (42)
for all i = 1;:::;k, all si+1 = 1;:::;k and all s0 such that s0
i+1 = si+1, then
it is an equilibrium allocation of the cyclical economy (u;e;n).
32As previously, superscripts refer to consumers, while subscripts to sunspot contingent com-
modities. Notice that consumption by each consumer i of the ”same-label” good i depends only
on his private signal, while his consumption of commodity i + 1 depends on the whole arrays of
sunspot signals, i.e. on the state of the world. This amounts to say that consumption of the
”same-label” commodity is decided as if it took place ex ante to the realization of the uncertainty
while consumption of any other commodity takes place ex post, and therefore can be made con-
tingent to it. Thus, this is not a one-shot economy, but it rather shares somehow the sequential
character of the overlapping generations economy, while staying a ﬁnite horizon economy. This
pattern of dependence of the consumption of diﬀerent commodities on diﬀerent information sets
is imported here from Maskin and Tirole (1987), and is reminiscent of the interpretation of the
”same-label” commodity as leisure which can be either consumed or used to produce a commodity
to be traded with other consumers, very much as in the usual macroeconomics interpretation of
the overlapping generations economy as an economy in which young agents produce, save their
wage and consume it when old (see, for instance, Azariadis and Guesnerie (1986)).
33It may seem incongruous at ﬁrst sight that the price pis0 may depend on the entire array of
sunspot signals while consumer i is not able to infer from its observation the state of the world
realized. As a matter of fact, pis0 will not depend at equilibrium on any other sunspot signal than









i=1gs2S constitute an equilib-
rium of the cyclical economy (u;e;n) then, for all i = 1:::;n and all
si = 1;:::;k, (ci
isi;(ci
i+1s0)s0js0
i=si) is the solution to the problem (40) above,
i.e. there exist positive multipliers 
isi























s0 pi+1s0 = 0 , 8s0js0
i = si
pis0(ci
isi  e1) + pi+1s0(ci
i+1s0  e2) = 0 , 8s0js0
i = si:
(43)
Multiplying the ﬁrst equation by (ci
isi  e1), each equation in the second
line by the corresponding (ci
i+1s0  e2) and adding all them up taking into
account the budget constraints in the third line, the condition (41) follows.
(2) In order to produce a set of prices pis, one for each commodity i = 1;:::;n






i=1 as an equilibrium, let p1s, for each state of



































Then the allocation of resources satisﬁes the feasibility condition by as-
sumption, as well as the ﬁrst order conditions: the budget constraints are

































34Actually just one p1s needs to be ﬁxed arbitrarily, all the other prices of commodity 1 at
each state of the world being determined by the normalization (44).
35Notice that since, ﬁrstly, from the feasibility condition (42), ci1
is cannot depend at equi-
librium on any other sunspot signal that si and, secondly, (c1
1s1  e1)p1s does not depend on s
according to the normalization (44), then pis cannot depend on any other sunspot signal than si
and, thus, equilibrium prices do not convey any information on the signal observed by anybody
else, as we had already anticipated in footnote 33.
19where the last equality follows from the feasibility condition; the partial
derivatives of the lagrangian with respect to ci
i+1s0, for all s0 2 S such that
s0
i = si, are all zero by the very deﬁnition of the multipliers 
isi
s0 , and the
partial derivative with respect to ci




























































where the last two equalities follow from the feasibility condition (42) and
the condition (41) respectively.
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i+1. Thus, if we denote by ci
i+1si+1 the
common value of ci
i+1s for all the states s 2 S with the same si+1, then an equilib-






































i+1si+1 = e1 + e2: (50)
In the next example an equilibrium is produced for the simple case of an economy
with two agents and signals taking two values each.
Example 2. Consider a 2-cyclical economy as depicted in Figure 2. An equilibrium
allocation of this economy consists of same-label commodity consumptions for each




22, and the like for the other com-




12, such that (49)
and (50) above are satisﬁed.









22) to form a box as shown in Figure 2, although in general this box needs
not be neither square nor laying on the diagonal. Nonetheless, the allocation has
to be necessarily such that there exist probabilities s for which (49) holds. This
condition leads to a non-homogeneous system of ﬁve linear equations in the four











sisi+1, for i = 1;2, and si;si+1 = 1;2, stands for the inner product of con-
sumer i’s gradient with his excess demand (notice that in the case of a symmetrical
allocation as the one depicted in Figure 2, this condition is satisﬁed).
Moreover, as in the Example 1 in section 4.1 on k-SSE, the left-hand side of (49)
can be interpreted as 0 being in the convex hull of the inner products of gradients
and excess demands, the weights making 0 a convex linear combination of the latter
being the probabilities of s conditional to the private information. Thus, in order
to have the right signs for those inner products, agent 1’s oﬀer curve must separate
the top and bottom corners of the allocation box, while agent 2’s oﬀer curve must
separate the left and right corners (see Figure 2).
Yet for the allocation in Figure 2 to be at equilibrium, it remains to be checked
that there exists indeed a probability distribution for the two private signals such
that (49) is satisﬁed. This is particularly easy to see in this example because, as we
have seen in the Example 1, this allocation determines a 2-SSE of the overlapping
generations economy with agent 1 as representative agent. In other words, there
exists a Markov matrix (mij) whose rows are the weights which put 0 as convex
linear combination of the inner products of gradients and excess demands for agent
1 (and hence for agent 2 as well, because of the symmetry). The trick is now to see
that there exists a joint distribution (s) for the two signals, inducing conditional
distributions of each signal given the other which coincide with the Markov matrix
of the 2-SSE, i.e. that there is a solution in 11, 12, 21 and 22 to
11 + 12 + 21 + 22 = 1
12
11 + 12 = m12 21
11 + 22 = m21
21
11 + 21 = m12 12
12 + 22 = m21:
(52)
In eﬀect, this system has as its unique solution
11 = (1  m12)m21
m21 + m12 ; 12 = m12m21
m21 + m12 = 21; 22 = m12(1  m21)
m21 + m12 : (53)
This solution is actually the one provided in Forg` es and Peck (1995) when the
connection that they establish between the sunspot equilibria of an overlapping
generations economy and the correlated equilibria of a market game mimicking it,
is particularized to the case of 2-SSE, our agents 1 and 2 being their odd and even
generations.
The procedure followed in the previous example, to link the equilibria of the
cyclical economy with asymmetric information to 2-SSE of the overlapping gener-
ations economy, seems to be straightforward enough to expect it to go through for
general k-SSE as well, as it was indeed conjectured in Maskin and Tirole (1987).
Nevertheless, D´ avila (1999) showed that this is typically not the case. The reason
is that the class of k-SSE is not the right choice to try extend the connection, but
rather that of markovian sunspot cycles, as Proposition 6 in the next section shows.
4.3 The connection with extrinsic uncertainty.
Recalling the conditions (35,36) characterizing the allocation of a markovian
sunspot cycle of period n and order k, and dependent on the current sunspot
21only, of the overlapping generations economy (u;e), their similarity to the condi-
tions (49,50) characterizing the equilibrium allocation of the corresponding cyclical
economy (u;e;n) with private sunspot signals, hints at the following proposition,
which establishes the connection between the markovian sunspot cycles of (u;e)
and the equilibria of its associated cyclical economies.
Proposition 6. Any markovian sunspot cycle of period n and dependent only on
the current sunspot, of an overlapping generations economy (u;e) can be translated
into an equilibrium of any of its cyclical economies (u;e;n0) with private sunspot
signals, with n0 multiple of n, and conversely.36
Proof. Eliminating ci
22 from (35,36) and ci
i+1si+1 from (49,50), and letting37 ci
11 =
ci
isi whenever 1 = si, the two sets of equations turn out to be the same one, but
for the number of equations (n in (35), n0 in (49)), if it happened to be the case















00 = m12 (54)
whenever (1;2) = (si;si+1). Leaving aside for a moment whether (54) can actu-
ally hold true and assuming it can, since n0 is a multiple of n, a solution to (35)
becomes a solution to (49) by replication and, the other way round, a solution to
(49) is at least a solution to (35) for the case n = n0, while it may well be also a
replication of a solution to (35) for some n divisor of n0.38
Now let us see that, whichever is the k  k Markov matrix (mij) driving the
sunspot signal in the overlapping generations economy (u;e), there is a probability
distribution (s) for s 2 f1;:::;kgn
0
in the cyclical economy (u;e;n0), such that
(54) holds. In eﬀect, the equations (54) together with the necessary condition
X
s2f1;:::;kgn0
s = 1 (55)
form a system of n0(k2 k)+1 linear equations (for each agent i = 1;:::;n0, there
is one condition for each oﬀ-diagonal entry of the Markov matrix and, moreover,
all the probabilities have to add up to one), in kn
0
variables (the probabilities s,
for all s 2 f1;:::;kgn
0
). The number of degrees of freedom of the system is then
36As a matter of fact, in the case n0 = 2 the statement actually holds true if k = 2 (see
Example 2 in section 4.2), but not for k  3 typically (see D´ avila (1999)).
37Again, as in the certainty case, a more careful notation has been sacriﬁced for the sake of
the readability of the argument and thus remarks similar to those in footnote 13 apply. Namely,
in the case i = n, cn
1s1 = cn
nn, with n = s1, does not refer to any constraint on the choice of the
n-th consumer of the cyclical economy, but to the identiﬁcation of his consumption of commodity
n when observing n (= s1) to the n-th consumption when young if s1 (= n) is observed in the
sunspot cycle of the overlapping generations economy. As in the certainty case too, if n < n0,
then for any right-hand side i exceeding n, ci
ii is to be identiﬁed to ci mod k
1s1 whenever i = s1.
38See footnote 14 in the proof of Proposition 3.
22kn
0
n0(k2 k)1, which is positive for any n0 > 2 and k  2.39 This implies that
the linear subspace of solutions to (54) has positive dimension and, therefore, in
order to show that the system of equations has a solution, it suﬃces to show that
this linear subspace meets the interior of the positive orthant, because in that case
it necessarily meets the aﬃne space (55) as well.
In eﬀect, each subspace associated to an equation in (54) meets the strictly
positive orthant, otherwise it would be possible to separate these two convex sets
by a hyperplane. However, this hyperplane can only be the subspace itself. But
then, necessarily, a normal vector of such hyperplane would have to be in the strictly
positive orthant too. Nevertheless, it can be easily seen that the normal vector of
each subspace in (54) has positive (of the form 1  m12) as well as negative (of
the form m12) coordinates. So the separation is not possible and thus the non
trivial intersection subspace determined by the system (54) does meet the positive
orthant indeed. Hence it meets the aﬃne space (55) and a solution to the system
exists40 
5. Some examples of properties following from the connection
We conclude showing how the previous results may be used to derive properties
of one of the frameworks studied by means of importing known properties of the
other. The statements below follow readily from the identiﬁcations established
in Propositions 3 and 6. Property 1 is a simple and straightforward application
of Proposition 3. Properties 2 and 3 have more interesting on their own and I’ll
comment on them below. Property 4 illustrates the problems that the introduction
of asymmetric information on sunspots may generate for the indeterminacy of ﬁnite
economies.
Property 1. Any single-commodity overlapping generations economy with repre-
sentative agent has generically a ﬁnite number of cycles of any given period.
In eﬀect, since a cycle of period n of (u;e) is an equilibrium of (u;e;n) and,
by Debreu (1970), generically there are ﬁnitely many of the later, the conclusion
follows.
Property 2. Any generic single-commodity overlapping generations economy al-
lowing for heterogeneity across generations is indistinguishable during any arbitrar-
ily long period of observation of an economy with no cycle at all.41
In order to see this property, let f(ut;et)gt2Z be an overlapping generations
economy allowing for diﬀerent preferences and endowments across generations, and
let t0, t1 and n be integers such that t0 < t1 and t1  t0 < n.
39It can easily be checked that 1 is, for every integer n0, both a root and a critical point of the
polynomial in k deﬁning the number of degrees of freedom fn0(k) = kn0
n0(k2k)1. Moreover
its curvature is non-negative at k = 1 and strictly increasing at every positive k, for every n0  3.
Therefore fn0(k) is strictly convex at every k  1, for every n0  3 and, thus, fn0(k) has no root
bigger than 1, which guarantees fn0(k) > 0 for all k  2 and n0 > 2. As for the case n0 = 2, see
the footnote 36.
40As a matter of fact, there is a continuum of them whenever the number of degrees of freedom
of the system is bigger than 1, which is always the case but for k = 2 and n0 = 3.
41Not even steady state.
23For all i = 1;:::;n let ˜ ui = ut0+i and ˜ ei = et0+i, and consider the n consumers,
n commodities cyclical economy42 f(˜ ui; ˜ ei)gn
i=1. Generically, this economy has an
odd number of equilibria and none of them exhibits any kind of symmetry (i.e.
none is invariant to any power strictly divisor of n, of the nn permutation matrix
 whose typical entry ij is 1 if j = i + 1, and 0 otherwise). Since Propositions 1
through 3 still hold true if the utility function diﬀers across agents (that is to say,
substituting ut and ui to u in the overlapping generations and cyclical frameworks
respectively), then the overlapping generations economy f(˜ ut; ˜ et)gt2Z such that
(˜ ut; ˜ et) = (˜ ui; ˜ ei) for any t 2 Z and i = 1;:::;n satisfying t = i mod n, which
cannot be distinguished from f(ut;et)gt2Z during the period [t0;t1], has no cycle
of any period smaller than n, and hence none of period smaller than the length of
the period of observation t1  t0.
Property 3. There exist robust single-commodity overlapping generations econo-
mies allowing for heterogeneity across generations which exhibit a behavior arbitrar-
ily close to a cycle during any given period of observation, without having cycles at
all during that period.
In eﬀect, for any given integers t0 < t1, let n be a divisor of t1  t0. Let also
f(ui;ei)gn
i=1 be an n-cyclical economy allowing for heterogeneity across agents, and
f(ut;et)gt2Z be the corresponding overlapping generations economy (i.e. such that
(ut;et) = (ui;ei) for all t 2 Z and i = 1;:::;n such that t = i mod n).
Consider any integer n0 multiple of n and bigger than t1  t0, and also the
cyclical economy f(ui;ei)gn
0
i=1 such that ui = ui mod n and ei = ei mod n for all
i = 1;:::;n0. Since Propositions 1 through 3 still hold true with heterogeneous
agents, then, on the one hand, any equilibrium of f(ui;ei)gn
0
i=1 is a cycle of period
n0 of the corresponding overlapping generations economy and conversely, while on
the other hand, any equilibrium of f(ui;ei)gn
i=1 is a cycle of period n of the corre-
sponding overlapping generations economy and conversely. But the two overlapping
generations economies are the same one: f(ut;et)gt2Z. Hence, there is a one-to-one
mapping between the equilibria of f(ui;ei)gn
i=1 and those of f(ui;ei)gn
0
i=1, in such a
way that necessarily every equilibrium of the latter is invariant to the n0=n power
of the permutation . That is to say, the cycles of period n0 of f(ui;ei)gn
0
i=1 are
actually cycles of period n.
Now, arbitrarily close to the economy f(ui;ei)gn
0
i=1 there is another economy
f(˜ ui; ˜ ei)gn
0
i=1 whose equilibria are not invariant any more to any permutation, and
correspond thus to true cycles of period n0. Nevertheless, by continuity the equilib-
ria of the economy f(˜ ui; ˜ ei)gn
0
i=1 are still close to those of f(ui;ei)gn
0
i=1. Therefore,
the cycles of period n0 (longer than the period of observation [t0;t1]) of the cor-
responding overlapping generations economy f(˜ ut; ˜ et)gt2Z, look approximately like
cycles of period n, although this economy has no cycles at all. The robustness
follows from the fact that the same property holds for any overlapping generations
economy close enough to this one.
The positive import of the last two properties is not completely uninteresting: if
the overlapping generations model is still to be taken as an stylized account of actual
economies but, nevertheless, the existence of a representative agent is an admittedly
unrealistic assumption, there is little hope for observing pure cycles no matter
how long the period of observation is, while approximate cycles (i.e. recurrent
42As usual, consumer i derives utility from, and is endowed with commodities i and i+1 only.
24but irregular behavior, very much as in actual business cycles) can nonetheless be
observed.
Property 4. In a ﬁnite economy, the use by the agents of private information
completely unrelated to the fundamentals may lead to the existence of a continuum
of equilibria.
To illustrate this point, consider the ﬁnite economy in Figure 2. As we have seen
in the Example 2 in section 4.2, any 2-SSE of the overlapping generations econ-
omy whose representative agent is agent 1 is also an equilibrium of this economy.
Since there is uncountably many 2-SSE of the former, there is also a continuum of
equilibria of the latter.
Similar statements could be made on the number of equilibria of any cyclical
economy (u;e;n) when there are private sunspots, if one considers the set of sunspot
cycles of (u;e), which has the power of the continuum as well. Of course, the
cyclical economies have a very special structure. Nonetheless, the point should
be general enough. For instance, in the economy in Figure 2, if the agents are not
required to share the same beliefs on the joint distribution of the sunspots, then the
symmetry between the two agents can be readily disposed of: continua of equilibria
depending on private sunspots still appear as long as there is an ”allocation box”
(not necessarily square now) whose corners are separated by the agents’ oﬀer curves
qualitatively in the same way they are in Figure 2. Obviously, this equilibria cannot
be rational expectations equilibria anymore, in the sense that there is at least one
agent who is mistaking the joint distribution of the signals. But since the signals
are private sunspots, who can be sure about what is in everybody else’s mind?
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